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THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

[IN OUTLINE].

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The definition of Philosophy must distinguish it from various forms of literature, critical, æsthetic or religious, as well as from the special sciences. These forms of literature and the special sciences may however assist in realizing the grand purpose of Philosophy. Their function is a part of the greater one of self-cognition in which man as man is engaged. In its Philosophy each nation attempts to solve the problems of the world as they appear to it from the stand-point of its national life. The Philosophy of a given epoch endeavors to state in ultimate terms the elements of the problem as it occurs in that epoch. The peculiarity of the philosophic solution consists in this: it attempts to reduce the immediate and contradictory elements as they are given in life to the ultimate terms or expressions which indicate the universal and necessary conditions out of which those elements have arisen. Hence every Philosophy presents us (1) the *form* or principle which explains the multiplicity of existence (this being something eternal, infinite—a permanent, unchangeable idea), and (2) the empirical elements that are to be explained—the multiplicity

of existence. The difference between systems of Philosophy is not to be found so much in the explanatory principle adopted as in the empirical elements which it attempts to explain. The life of man continually presents new phases. Consequently his world changes, and in one age he has one set of conditions to solve, and in another quite a different one. The solutions he gives in his Philosophy have a substantial agreement, but the systems seem very diverse, because the facts of the world are described from different points of view.

In the most rudimentary form of knowing, i. e., in sense-perception, there is a synthesis of the two extremes of cognition—1st, the immediately conditioned content which is the particular object as here and now perceived—2d, the accompanying perception of the self or Ego which perceives, that is, the activity of self-consciousness—the knowledge that it is I who am subject in this particular act of perception. Hence in sense-perception two objects are necessarily combined: (a) the particular object here and now presented, (b) the universal subject of all activity of perceiving.

This universal subject which is thus its own object in all forms of knowing, appears in two characters: 1st, it is absolutely particular, i. e., present in this special moment now and here and in this special act of perception: and, 2d, it is absolutely universal, retaining its self-identity under the constant change or flux which essentially belongs to the process of the immediate now and here, or present moment. The present now is a point in time and thus has no endurance except through the synthetical addition of past or future times which *are* not but either *were* or else *will be*. Thus such a thing as the perception of the permanent or a *relation of any sort* (for example, the one of identity, or of difference, the most elementary and fundamental ones) cannot transpire without attention on the part of the subject who perceives, to the perception of self, or to the universal factor which is present in perception. This act of attention to self is reflection—self-perception entering all perception.

The degree of the power of reflection, or of attention to self-consciousness measures the ability to generalize or the ability to think—in other words, the strength of thought. For the minimum of this power of reflection admits barely the possibility of combining the perceptions of time-moments that are slightly sepa-

rated, and hence its results are the mere perception of identity or difference without quantity or quality thereof. Sense perception increases in richness of knowledge in proportion as the power of synthesis or of combining the successive elements of perception increases. And this power of combining such separate elements is contingent on the power of reflection or of attention to the self-activity in perception. Such reflection has been called "second intention," and is the condition of all generalization. Self-consciousness is therefore the basis of all knowledge; for all predication—from the emptiest assertion: "this is now"—up to the richest statement involving the ultimate relation of the world to God as the highest principle, is possible only through a withdrawal of the mind out of the limiting conditions of the particular here and now, by means of attention to its own activity, which, as already pointed out, comprehends the two phases of absolute particularity and absolute universal potentiality in one.

This is the psychological basis of the general principle laid down regarding the identity of systems of Philosophy and their phases of difference. The naive state of mind of the uncultured human being, alike with the acute philosophical intellect or the intuition of a religious mystic, involves in all its activities and at every moment thereof this phase of attention to the self-activity, or to the subject which knows. The naive or non-philosophical stage of consciousness differs from the philosophical stage in the fact that the latter sets up some one of its cognitions as the highest principle, through which it attempts to explain the totality of said cognitions, while the former makes no such attempt. The Philosophical activity of the mind is therefore a *third intention* or act of attention which has for its object the reference of individual cognitions to an assumed supreme principle.

This Philosophical act it is evident, therefore, is a species of reflection different from that reflection which is implicit in all cognition. It is an act of withdrawal of the mind from immediate cognition (which arises through the first and second intention, or perception and reflection) and a concentration of the attention upon the relation of that immediate cognition as existing in its separate details, to all cognition as totality. It is therefore systematic knowing. Moreover, it may posit as its supreme principle any one of its cognitions, taking for example an empty one lying close to the sensuous pole of cognition, or a concrete one lying close to the pure Ego. Thus it may make matter, or some

form of matter, as water, air, fire or ether, the philosophical principle which is to explain all things—being universal and particular at the same time; or it may take for this purpose Reason (*νοῦς*), the Will, the Idea, the Good, *Causa sui*, the self-representing monad, or some form nearly approaching the pure Ego for its principle. But the psychological presupposition underlying all Philosophy, whether materialistic or spiritualistic, is the fact of withdrawal or abstraction of the mind from its first stage of cognition and the contemplation of the same under the form of relation to a single principle, i. e., to an absolute totality.

This contains the remarkable result that in this species of knowing the mind views its first principles, or the primitive existences by which it explains things, as *self-activities*—which means that mind sees under all its knowledge its own form as the ultimate truth of all. Take the stand-point of materialistic philosophy for example: matter is the ultimate principle, the whence and whither of all. Matter is thus posited as a universal which is the sole origin of all particular existences and also the final goal of the same.* But “matter,” as such idea, is a cognition which arises only through reflection; it is perceived by “second intention,” for first intention only refers or relates to immediate particular objects and not to general objects like “matter” which is only a term for the persistent activity which recurs in the perception of whatever objects in time or space. As cognition of the mind, therefore, “matter” is a product of “second intention,” but as philosophic principle it is more than this; it is this special cognition of matter posited as the absolute or as the totality and

*Hence matter is active, giving rise to special existences, and also changing them into others with all the method and arrangement which we can see in natural laws. For matter must contain in it potentially all that comes from it. Hence matter is creative, causing to arise in its own general substance those particular limitations which constitute the differences and individuality of things. It is negative or destroyer in that it annuls the individuality of particular things, causing to vanish those limitations which separate or distinguish this thing from that other. Such a principle as this matter is assumed to be, which causes existences to arise from itself by its own activity upon itself and within itself, entirely unconditioned by any other existence or energy, is self-determination, and therefore analogous to that factor in sensuous knowing which was called the Ego or self-consciousness—an activity which was universal and devoid of form, and yet incessantly productive of forms and destructive of the same. All this is implied in the theory of materialism, and exists there as separate ideas, only needing to be united by inferences.

entirety of cognition, and hence not as limited through other particular cognitions, but as containing within itself all limitations necessary for the particularization of other cognitions. Hence it is a pure Ego in so far as the possibility of all special ideas are concerned, and an active process so far as actual particular existence arises from it. Thus the position even of materialistic Philosophy implies the thought of totality, which is purely universal, and a pure activity originating particular existence at the same time. And here we meet the most important distinction which belongs to the definition of Philosophy.

The degrees of consciousness are various, and differ through the completeness with which they grasp the determinations of the self-activity of the Ego. On the stage of Philosophy consciousness grasps determination as a totality, and hence as self-determination. But this may happen in all shapes from the emptiest up to the fullest and concretest. Even in materialism, the attempt to explain the world through an ultimate principle, indicates the certitude of the mind of the objectivity of its principle of self-determination, and it therefore implicitly asserts and presupposes that the truth of things is self-determination. And yet it may under this form so far contradict itself as to place for its content "matter," thinking under the term a vague abstraction as the origin of all immediate particularity, and as the final cause thereof, without distinctly defining to itself these attributes as belonging to matter as highest principle.

There are then various forms of Philosophy, differing in the degree of completeness in which they consciously define their highest principle as the concrete universal which originates the particular by its self-activity, and thus realizes itself in its own externality.

The distinction of Philosophy from Religion—which would be thought, at first, to be a reduction of all specialty to an absolute principle in the same manner as defined for the province of Philosophy, lies in the fact that while Philosophy attempts to comprehend the totality of things through its absolute principle, Religion *represents* its absolute, and thus may exist for all stages of theoretical consciousness; for its revelation, although of the highest, is not immediately addressed to the theoretical reason, but rather to the Will. Hence it presents its absolute, not for assimilation, but for practical reconciliation with the individual. The relation of Theosophy to Philosophy is here to be defined.

Setting out from the stand-point of Religion, and positing the Absolute of Religion as not only principle of human action, but also of theoretical cognition, the Theologian explains the world of Nature and of History through it. This constitutes Theosophy. It purports to arise through special illumination of the mind by the Absolute, and may be very profound and complete, and even concrete in its theory of things, but will of necessity use categories borrowed from Religion, and consequently tinged with pictured representations, while Philosophy uses its thoughts abstractly and derives them from the activity of reflection.

With these distinctions in view it will be seen that very important presuppositions are involved in the passage of a Philosophy from a stage of dogmatism to that of criticism, or from criticism to the construction of a new system upon the critical basis.

A dogmatical system of Philosophy proceeds psychologically from the third intention of the mind, inasmuch as it not merely perceives general principles or forms (as in the act of "generalization" or the second intention of the mind) but it perceives their inter-relation—the subordination of all to one principle, selected as the ultimate explanation of all. Within Philosophy itself arises a *fourth intention*. The attention of the mind in its fourth intention is directed not merely to the relation of the ultimate principle to the world (regarded under the phases of particular and general existences) but to the method by which the relation is traced from one to the other. Each higher intention of the mind has for its object the previous intention of the mind and its relation to those (if any) preceding it. Thus the second intention (ordinary generalization) notes the relations between sensuous perceptions by attending to its own activity in perception. The third intention of the mind notes the relation of all objects of the mind, whether general (of the second intention) or special (of the first intention) to one principle (of course selected from the objects of second intention)—and it does this by attending to its own activity in the act of second intention. The fourth intention notes the activity of the mind in its third intention, and hence recognizes the form under which the many are related to the one—it notes the *method* of the philosophical system.

The "fourth intention" as here described makes its first appearance in Philosophy as Scepticism. No one of the naive or dogmatic systems of Philosophy can resist Scepticism, for the reason that it rests on a relatively deeper and truer insight. It

perceives the method and bases its strictures on a criticism of that method. But Scepticism is only a rudimentary form of the higher insight. The result of a thorough critical investigation of method leads to a consistent system based on the fourth intention—a system which may be called the dialectical system, inasmuch as it exhibits everywhere the ultimate principle as the vital element of the multiplicity of existences.

The richest phases of Philosophy for the study of one who would gain an insight into its living growth, are therefore those of Scepticism: for example, in ancient times the dialectic of the old and new tropes as found in Sextus Empiricus—in modern times the dicta of Hume and Kant. Scepticism surveys the thought-movement of its time as a totality, and begins the study of method. It awakens the speculative mind and prepares it for new and vigorous studies. The sceptical reaction of the Sophists—especially of Gorgias—leads to the glory of the triumvirate, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. The reaction of Hume and the counter-reaction of Kant leads to Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. The reaction against Averroism leads to Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart.

The first question in a History of Philosophy is: where to begin? At what period and in what country did human thought first direct itself to the task of finding a one principle through which it could explain all else? In the definition of Philosophy given above, this characteristic of philosophic thought as such has been pointed out. Common sense, ordinary knowledge, religion, the special sciences, literary art, moral science, &c., have been distinguished from Philosophy by the application of this test.

The first writer who has treated the History of Philosophy in a thoroughly sympathetic spirit is Hegel. He endeavors with great depth of speculative insight, imitative vitality of reproduction, and acuteness of general criticism, to interpret and expound the different philosophic systems to the reader. Taking the point of view of the system he is treating, he exhibits the course of thought by which its members originate, and the limitations which react upon it and cause it to give way to subsequent systems.

CHAPTER I. ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

Hegel and his followers have excluded the Orient from the do-

main of the history of philosophy, alleging as a ground for this that Oriental thinking is not emancipated from the religious phases of mind. Among peoples who have not yet achieved political freedom, he thinks philosophy impossible.

Although this view possesses such strong claims for adoption that it has widely influenced the recent writings on this subject outside of the Hegelian school, it must not receive a too literal interpretation. Imperfect accounts of Oriental systems, and these mostly given a theological bias by their European expounders (whose original authority is frequently Christian missionaries) have been hitherto, and are doubtless at the present time our only accessible sources of information.

1. *Chinese Philosophy*.—It would seem as though the Chinese systems of Lao-Tzu (604 B. C.) and Confucius (550 B. C.), possessed the requisite characteristic of philosophy. They undertake to explain the Universe from a substantial principle. *Tao* is the name of the first principle of the former, and is the indeterminate primitive substance "without name it is the [masculine] principle of the heavens and the earth; with name it is the mother of the Universe." This has been interpreted (unjustly) as the "Supreme Reason." But it is simply an abstract substance (or negative unity). The system of Confucius is not materially different. It calls the primitive substance *Tai-ki* and makes two principles emanate from it, the one masculine (*yang*) symbolized by a horizontal line (—) is the perfect, the father, unity, or the affirmative; the second, feminine (*yin*) represented by the first line broken into two (— —) is the imperfect, the mother, duality, or the negative. The four combinations which arise from combining these (==, ==, ==, ==) signify perfect matter and imperfect matter, each in its strength and weakness. A further combination by threes gives rise to eight *kua* signifying heaven, cloud-mist, fire, thunder, wind, water, mountains, earth. Further combination by fours is given.

Herein we note the Chinese principle of the family as the basis of the national state and religion, reappearing in its philosophic system. The parents, male and female, are transfigured into abstractions and become the two originating principles of all things. This crude quantitative expression by means of broken lines is inferior to the Pythagorean system of symbolism by numbers, for number possesses a far higher universality than horizontal lines.

2. *Indian Philosophy.* — East Indian Philosophy possesses greater interest to people of the Occident than does the Chinese system. In Sanscrit literature we find the embryonic shapes and metamorphoses of modern literature. Indian thought is a kind of pre-historic adumbration of European thought. For the reason that the will and the intellect are not yet, in the Orient, so far developed as to present the modern contrast of theoretical and practical, philosophy as independent thinking goes but little way either in China or India; it very soon takes a practical direction and becomes moral or ethical. The arbitrary will of the despot (whether in state, church, the family or the community) everywhere prevails; there is no constitutional limitation of the will of the tyrant of the State, or code of laws to limit the will of the other species of tyrants. The only amelioration of this condition lies in the personal sense of justice, or the magnanimity of the ruler or master. Hence the wise men of China, India and Persia have left ethical treatises rather than philosophemes seeking to curb the arbitrary will by moral principles and to kindle the sense of duty in the minds of the rulers and masters. In our age and country it matters little whether the ruler is of a tyrannical disposition or not, the people are protected by constitutional limitations, and the one in power finds an impersonal mould in which he must act, if he acts at all. When the moral forms of freedom get realized in statutes, the wise man gives less attention to the ethical view and more to the purely theoretical. The lack of established institutions of justice in the shape of civil laws and constitutions produces the intensity of moral inspiration which we see in such teachers as Confucius, Mencius, Zoroaster, Saadi, Vyasa, Gautama, Patanjali, and their peers.

This explanation must be borne in mind in studying the systems of Asiatic thought. The moral precocity of its wise men must not blind us to the compensating defect which is its occasion.

The translation of the *Bhagavad Gita* by Wilkins, (1785), is the source whence the current ideas regarding Indian Philosophy have come. This remarkable episode in the National epic, the Mahabharata, contains nearly all of the grand mysteries of the Brahmanic religion. Its system of philosophy is the Yoga or ascetic doctrine, of which there are two branches. The one of Patanjali enjoins avoidance of temptation, and tends to renuncia

tion and quietism, while the other, called the *Karma Yoga*, which enjoins the combatting of temptation, and arms its devotees for the active contest with evil, is the doctrine of the *Bhagavad Gita*. The Yoga systems are founded on the *Sankhya* or rational system founded by Kapila (*Sankhya Karika*,* translation by Colebrooke published in 1837). Independent of the *Sankhya* or rationalistic system is the *Nyaya* or logical system of Gautama, with its modification in the atomic system of Kanada, called the *Vaisheshika*. Besides these there is the Vedic system, full of mysticism, including an earlier school of commentary on the Veda, called *Purva Mimansa*, founded by Jaimini, and a later one called *Uttara Mimansa* founded by Krishna Dwaipayana, the supposed compiler of the Vedas. The Vedic system is reactionary against Philosophy.

The most important of these is the *Sankhya* system, inasmuch as it stands opposed to the religious form of authority, and approximates the proper form of philosophy. It has an atheistical left wing, a theistical centre, and the Yoga systems for its right wing. The general point of view of Indian thought is that of emanation. Individuality is regarded as having arisen from limitation of the abstract essence or being of the deity. Hence the individuality of material things and also of souls is a negation of true being and must perish. That which distinguishes one being from another is an addition from without, involves externality, and is a fetter and hindrance preventing the attainment of the divine.

Emancipation—"liberation of the soul"—is accordingly the great object, first of the Indian religion and next of its philosophy. From individuality arises pain: for compaction of one being with another outside of it is the source of all pain. Hence the *Sankhya Karika* begins with the announcement of its fundamental problem: "Our inquiry is into the means of avoiding the three sorts of pain; for pain is embarrassment," i. e., external limitation. Here we have the fundamental characteristic of Oriental thought exhibited at the outset, even in the purest and most abstract of its philosophic systems. It seeks liberation of the soul, an object which belongs equally well to ethics, and is the especial end and aim of religion, and thus justifies Hegel's rejection of it from the domain of Philosophy. "By seven

*See Jour. Spec. Phil., Vol. II., p. 225.

modes Nature binds herself by herself, by one she releases herself for the soul's wish. So through the study of principles, the conclusive, incontrovertible, one only knowledge is attained, that neither I AM nor is aught mine, nor do I exist. Possessed of this [self-knowledge] the soul contemplates, at leisure and at ease, nature; [thereby] debarred from prolific change, and consequently precluded from those seven forms." "When separation of the in-formed soul from its corporeal frame at length takes place, and nature in respect of it ceases, then is absolute and final deliverance accomplished." Whether this doctrine is to be interpreted as that of the annihilation and absorption of the soul into the nothingness of the absolute, or whether we are to understand it as a statement of the theory that when mind recognizes the external world to be phenomenal, (*Maya*) "nature desists" or ceases to be regarded as an independent (from mind) existence, and the soul is "debarred from prolific change" because it now knows the fundamental truth and no longer wanders about in error, now taking this and now that natural principle for the highest,—is in dispute. The *Vishnu Purana* says: "Until all acts which are the causes of notions of individuality are discountenanced, spirit is one thing and the universe is another to those who contemplate objects as distinct and various; but that is called true knowledge, or knowledge of Brahma which recognizes no distinctions, which contemplates only simple existence, which is undefinable by words, and is to be discovered solely in one's own spirit."

It is notable that while the Chinese Philosophy descends from the pure substance to special individuals in accordance with its monarchical State principle, the Indian Philosophy is a reaction against its social and political system of caste. The limitations through caste are so irksome and galling that theoretical mind seeks relief from the rigid particularity of the distinctions (tedious, ceremonial observances) which it encounters in life, by flight to the indefinite, vague and empty ground and substance of all things, and finds solid satisfaction in contemplating the pure identity wherein neither caste-differences nor the bewildering luxuriance of tropical nature, nor even the prolific creations of its own active fancy and teeming intellect, any longer find subsistence to vex and weary it.

3. *Buddhistic Philosophy*.—In Thibet and Farther India Buddhism, which is a comparatively modern reaction against Brah-

manism (initiated by Sakyamuni, 550 B. C.) replaces the aristocracy of the caste system by a monastic democracy. Instead of one caste only, the Brahman, all society may participate in a divine life, and each family has the possibility that one of its sons may become the Grand Lama, i. e., the visible manifestation of the Absolute. Rejecting with the caste system the burdensome ceremonies of the Brahmans, it retained the principles of the right wing of the Sankhya Philosophy, the *Yoga* doctrine, and added very little that is of metaphysical importance. Its doctrine of the *Nirvana* or deliverance of the soul from pain and illusion, is substantially the same as the 'liberation' of the *Sankhya Karika* or of the *Yogas*, and the same ambiguity attaches to it. While some hold it to be annihilation of the soul, others make it to mean merely the conquest over our animal passions and desires, the annihilation of selfishness described in the common language of mysticism. Its doctrine of *Sansara*, or of the mundane life is identical with that of *Maya* or illusion. The *Sansara* ceases in respect of the soul when the latter arrives at the knowledge of the illusion (i. e. phenomenal nature) which belongs to individuality, (a manifest repetition of the *Sankhya* doctrine).

4. *Philosophy of Persia, Syria, and Egypt*.—With the Persian race we arrive at a new and important element in philosophic thought, although thought scarcely yet deserves the name of Philosophy, being rather religious dogma. While the extreme East (China, India and Thibet) have seized true being as one and have regarded all multiplicity and individuality as mere illusion, the Persian seizes the thought of negation as something valid.

In the *Zend Avesta* of Zoroaster (*Zarathrustra*), the good and evil, light and darkness, are in perpetual conflict. Ormuzd (*Ahura Mazda*) and Ahriman are the deities who wage this warfare. With dualism arises the principle of activity as the basis of substance, and its unity is a concrete one, possessing individuality.

This doctrine is only germinal in the Persian dualism, and as we come westward to Phoenicia and Egypt we find no philosophic systems preserved. But in the outlines of the religious systems of those peoples and their influence upon the Greeks, we can trace a further growth of the consciousness of individuality as essential principle. The Adonis-worship of the Phoenicians recognizes pain as something positive and necessary to man, indeed as that through and by which he realizes his feeling of Self.

Hercules-worship (Melkarth) also originated here. By his labors, by renouncing his ease and comfort, by suffering in the service of man, he becomes a demi-god. Thus here pain is the agency by which the natural man becomes spiritual—involving the doctrine that individuality is something substantial.

In Egypt this tendency becomes still more noticeable. The immortality of the individual is celebrated in a variety of ways, and seems to have been the chief thought of the Egyptians. Their attention to the preservation of the bodies of the dead, their gigantic pyramids built as tombs for their kings, their incessant endeavor to symbolize in art the question of immortality of the individual—the sphinx, (rock, animal, man,—inorganic, organic, spiritual), the veiled goddess Neith (nature as mother of spirit) the Memnon statue, (matter becoming vocal when the light enters it), these show the fervor of their belief in the ascent of the soul out of nature, and of the permanence of its individuality. Their doctrine of Osiris, his death and resurrection, variously typical of processes in nature such as the cycle of the seasons, and of the life of the plant as buried seed, sprouting up, bearing seed again, &c., had a direct significance also in their theory of immortality, and corresponded in many respects to the Phœnician doctrine of Adonis.

These phases of thought agitated by the thinkers of Western Asia, whose systems of Philosophy have failed to reach us, perhaps because of the destruction of their nations by wars, reappear in Greek thought as presuppositions, which it has preserved in its mythology. Again in Neo-Platonism, which developed about Alexandria as a centre, a profound study is made of the symbols which embody these thoughts.

CHAPTER II. GREEK PHILOSOPHY.

In Greece, what Philosophy owes to the theogonies and cosmogonies of Homer and Hæsioid, and especially of Orpheus, is not certainly known, but can only be inferred, partly by the reactionary tone of the Ionic systems, and partly from the mystic tendency of the Pythagoreans and Platonists.

1. *Pre-Socratic Philosophy*.—Philosophy proper begins with Thales (640–550 B. C.) of Miletus, who proclaimed water to be the original source of all things, a doctrine still defended by Hippo of Samos in the time of Pericles. Anaximander (611–547 B. C.) and Anaximenes (528 B. C.) both of Miletus, follow next

in order; the former holding that the origin, which he called ἀρχή or principle, was indefinite (ἄπειρον); the latter holding that air is the first principle, and that all things are produced from it by condensation or rarefaction. Diogenes of Apollonia (468 B. C.) and Idaeus of Himera held the same doctrine. Heraclitus of Ephesus (500 B. C.) completes the list of Asiatic Greeks who agree in setting up a material principle as the explanation of things. Heraclitus takes particular notice of the process in nature, and asserts that all things flow and naught abides. Fire seems to him the material embodiment of this process. Cratylus, an extreme disciple of Heraclitus, was a teacher of Plato, and to his influence we owe the frequent reference in Plato's dialogues to Heraclitus. In his doctrine of the strife of opposites as the origin of all things, recent writers have discerned the Zoroastrian doctrine, received by him from Persians in Asia Minor.

From the Greek colonies in the East, in Asia Minor, we turn to those on the West, in Lower Italy, where Pythagoras of Samos (582 B. C.), who is supposed to have been a pupil of Anaximander and to have traveled in Egypt, had founded a society (in Crotona). To him is attributed the doctrine that numerical harmony is the essence of all things. His followers, Philolaus, Ocellus Lucanus, Timaeus Locrus, Epicharmus, are best known. Scarcely any Pythagorean writings however are believed to be genuine. The Neo-Platonist, Jamblichus, wrote his life, collecting the remarkable myths that seem to have circulated among his disciples.

Of the Eleatic Philosophers, Xenophanes of Colophon (569–480 B. C.) is the founder of the doctrine that unity is the principle of all, a doctrine aimed perhaps against the Polytheism of his countrymen. Parmenides (515–450 B. C.), the pupil of Xenophanes, is the greatest of the Eleatics. His doctrine: "Being is and nothing is not," is the most elementary phase of pure thought. Zeno of Elea (490 B. C.) and Melissus of Samos (440 B. C.), defended the doctrine of Parmenides, the former by inventing the dialectic, showing that the supposition of the many in opposition to Being involves contradictions, while the latter uses similar polemics, ("*Ex nihilo nihil fit*," there is no transition possible from nothing to being or *vice versa*).

Empedocles of Agrigentum (492–432 B. C.), (influenced by the doctrines of Heraclitus) set up the principles of love and hate as

moving principles in the origin of things, from four elements, earth, air, fire, and water.

Anaxagoras of Clazomenæ (500–428 B. C.), is famed for his announcement that Reason (*νοῦς*) is the principle of things.

Leucippus and Democritus of Abdera (460–370 B. C.), were the founders of the Atomic Philosophy. They posit the full and the void as principles of things, the full being indivisible atoms from which all things arise by agglomeration. "Atoms differ in shape, order and position."

Up to this point we have had the physical system of the Ionics (water, air, fire and earth); the numerical proportion of the Pythagoreans, the abstract thought of the Eleatics, Reason of Anaxagoras, and the atomic system of Democritus. All things are explained (*a*) as physical aggregates, or (*b*) as phases of a process of being, becoming, number, harmony or reason.

The sophists turn their attention toward the thinking subject in his individual character: Protagoras of Abdera (500–411 B. C.), taught "man is the measure of things," and "all truth is relative"; Gorgias of Leontini (483–375 B. C.), held the doctrine that "nothing exists"; Prodicus of Ceos (420 B. C.), was the teacher of Socrates.

2. *Socrates, Plato and Aristotle.* — With the appearance of Socrates (470–399 Before Christ), Greek Philosophy assumes a world-historical significance. He made the investigation of universals his specialty, seeking in the will the principle of virtue, and in the knowing the unchangeably true. He employed irony, keen definition and induction to remove old prejudices. His close connection of virtue with knowledge, and his definition of the good as the highest principle, furnish the foundation of the systems of his successors. Dialectics and ethics are thenceforth the chief philosophic disciplines. Of his immediate disciples there is the school of Euclid of Megara, that of Phaedo of Elis, both chiefly occupied with dialectics; the school of Antisthenes the Cynic, and of Aristippus the Cyrenaic, both occupied with ethical questions.

But the real successor of Socrates is Plato of Athens (427–347 B. C.), whose school extends through all intervening time to the present. Thirty-six of his compositions, in fifty-six books, have been transmitted to us, as genuine. Much ingenious speculation has been devoted to the subject of the order of composition and the internal connection of these works. The dialectic portion of

Plato's Philosophy is to be found best developed in the dialogues named the *Phaedrus*, the *Theætetus*, the *Phaedo*, the *Sophistes*, the *Philebus* and the *Parmenides*. His doctrine of ideas—is the centre of his system, and is inseparably connected with the investigations of his master, Socrates, into the permanent and universal elements of thought. The Sophists had seized the principle of Anaxagoras that νοῦς is the principle of things, and interpreted it that individual mind is the measure of all things, and proceeded on this basis to make all fixed convictions, whether in regard to religion, morals or truth, wavering and doubtful. They proved by trial that the activity of the intellect could undermine the whole fabric of conventional knowledge, and thus that reason is the negative might over the world which exists for man.

The appearance of Socrates constitutes an epoch, inasmuch as he discovers the existence of positive 'principles in reason that are valid and constructive, transcending the particular who announces them, and giving to the well-nigh empty assertion of Anaxagoras a wonderful depth of meaning. Plato's investigations clear up this subject still further, and Aristotle, who labors in the same general direction, leaves a system wherein the world is inventoried in its details, and shown to be throughout the work of νοῦς.

The first step in the inquiry consisted in tracing the changing and variable through its metamorphoses until its entire round of possibilities was exhausted. It is evident that the reality of a thing embraces only a small portion of its possibility, water at a given moment being either liquid or solid (ice) or vapor, but not all three at once. We can look upon its entire round of possibilities as its complete ideal, as its pure form, or in short as its *idea*. At this point the theory of Plato stops, and he leaves us with a world of ideal forms eternal in their nature, and containing the necessity of the things in the world, all of which are mere fragmentary realizations of their archetypes or patterns, the ideas. Particular existences are participations, imitations or images (εἰδωλα) of their ideas. The further thought of Aristotle cleared up the relation of these archetypal forms to each other so much as to reduce them to one rational principle or Personal Reason. The total round of potentialities belonging to an individual thing is identical with the totality of possibilities of every other thing, and hence there is one totality of pos-

sibilities and consequently one necessary ideal to the world. This ideal unity is the highest principle and its fragmentary realization in the particular things of the world becomes very complete and exhaustive when the world is taken also as a whole. The infinitude of things complementing their mutual deficiencies makes as a whole an adequate image of the divine archetype.

That Plato had glimpses of this thought we see from the *Timæus*, which indicates doctrines that were probably expanded much more fully in his oral discourses (*ἄγραφου δόγματα*), which related to the Good, and have not been reported to us. God as the absolute good does not grudge anything to the world, but has given all possible perfections and "begotten the world as a blessed god." This view is quite in contrast to that which makes the hypostatic ideas to be eternal in their independence and multiplicity, and shows that Plato stood quite firmly on the ground attributed to Aristotle, although he did not more than hint this in his dialogues, which were polemical and therefore negative in their stand-point. Besides this, the thought was new, and such a life with such opportunities as Aristotle had was needed to develop from this germ a vast system of consistent truth. Plato's physics was, accordingly, the least developed of the three parts of his Philosophy (being confined chiefly to his sketch in the *Timæus*.) His ethics is more fully developed. The larger part of the dialogues have for their object the uprooting of loose ideas of morality, and the inculcation of his doctrine of the highest good, "the attaining to a likeness to God who is the highest good"; "virtue is the fitness of the soul for good works," each part of the soul, theoretical and practical, having its specific good work to perform. The State, according to Plato, was a vast institution for the training of its citizens in virtue, making education its chief function. The rulers were to be chosen from the Philosophers.

The resemblance of the Platonic State to the Christian hierarchy of the Middle Ages has been pointed out by at least one writer, its resemblance to the Spartan State in important features, by many others. The Chinese State is not a bad example of it. Although he places justice at the head of the virtues to be taught by the State, yet he adds piety, modesty, bravery and wisdom, making his State rather an indistinguishable unity of

the principles of the family, civil society and religion, than a truly political organization.

Among the professed disciples of Plato are distinguished five schools: (a) that of the old academy to which belong Speusippus, Xenocrates, Heraclides, (who taught the revolution of the earth on its axis), Philip the Opuntian, Hermodorus, and others; (b) the sceptics Arcesilas and (c) Carneades, both of the middle academy; (d) Philo of Larissa, and (e) Antiochus of Ascalon, belong to the new academy, and prepare the way for Neo-Platonism.

Aristotle of Stagira (384–322 B. C.), is however the third (with Socrates and Plato) in the philosophic triumvirate of the ancient world. His Philosophy investigates the possibilities of natural and spiritual existences, and takes an inventory of them with a view to reaching an exhaustive statement or definition of the ideal totality of each existence or totality of existences. Thus he maps out the paths of the several particular sciences, and defines their several principles.

Since the totality of the possibilities of any one thing involves other things, or perhaps all things, (in its metamorphoses it will become these successively as it realizes its potentialities) it is evident that natural science will be synthetic and continue to trace out the unity not only of particular things in a common process, but also of entire departments of nature. When science exhausts the potentiality of a thing, or completes its inventory of it, it will possess a definition of the idea of that thing, i. e., its eternal archetype, its essential nature. Within this round of possibilities will circle forever the changes of the thing, and in the definition of its ideal will be revealed the final cause of its whole process. The circle of its potentiality includes the entire circle of its dependence and hence of its moving principles and resulting motion.

Thus the idea must be a self-determining form. This may be regarded as the general point of view of Aristotle, who unfolds it in logical, ethical, æsthetic, physical and metaphysical works. (a) His logical treatises are united in the organon, which discusses single terms, judgments, syllogisms, and their application to the practical use of the intellect. (b) His ethical treatises include an exhaustive discussion of morals, politics, and economics or social science, in which he is more careful than Plato, not to confound the province of the State with that of the family or

civil society. (c) He gives in his "Poetics" the fundamental ideas which are accepted to-day in æsthetical science; to this department belongs also his Rhetoric. (d) His work on Physics is a sort of rational cosmology; his works *De Coelo*, *De Generatione et Corruptione*, on meteorology, on the history of animals, and finally *De Anima*, each make an epoch in the history of science. (e) His work on metaphysics is a sort of history of philosophy and theology combined.

These writings formed the sacred scriptures of human thought for well nigh two thousand years, and their influence is just now greatly on the increase in Germany. Through Aquinas they are immovably fixed in Christian theology.

To give an account of the details of Aristotle's application of his fundamental principle and of his immense inductions would require a book, or several books. Even an outline of them cannot be given here. As their most important bearings will continually recur in later Philosophy (which in one sense is only commentary on Aristotle), such outline is unnecessary. The most important principles in which he has realized the general insight given above, are: (a) the necessary existence of each idea in its reality, as an individual, being either a system of interdependent things or else the soul of an organized, living being. Substance, (*οὐσία*), is therefore not an abstraction, it is concrete and individual; it is the union of matter (*ὑλη*) and form (i. e., ideal totality = *εἶδος*, *μορφή*, *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι*); it can possess true individuality only because it contains the total of potentialities, and hence is identical under all changes that fall within it; (b) the doctrine of first and second entelechies, or of self-actualizing entities, the first being germinal or rudimentary shapes and the latter being the complete actuality (*ἐνέργεια*); on this distinction is based the doctrine of the immortality of man. (c) The distinction between *νοῦς ποιητικός* as the *actus purus* which makes intellect and will possible, and the *νοῦς παθητικός* (or the activities of sense, memory, phantasy, discursive thought, and the appetites) is so important that all Christendom, with the assistance of Mohammedanism, devoted the best part of two centuries to getting an insight into it.

The Peripatetic school that followed closely the master, included the famous names of Theophrastus, Eudemus, Aristoxenus, Dicaearchus, and others. The most famous commentators on Aristotle are Alexander of Aphrodisias (A. D. 200), Porphyry, (A.

D. 233), Themistius (A. D. 387), Simplicius (A. D. 500), and later, Avicenna and Averroes. Zeno of Cittium (350–258 B. C.) founds the Stoic school, combining Aristotelian logic, Heraclitean physics, and other doctrines derived from the Socratic Schools, into a popular eclectic system whose chief end is ethical; it claims to be a continuation of the Socratic Philosophy. Epicurus (341–270 B. C.) modifies the doctrine of Aristippus and combines it with that of Democritus, founding a system of atomic materialism, whose ethical aim is happiness as the highest good. Pyrrho (360 B. C.), Timon the Sillograph (325 B. C.), Sextus Empiricus (A. D. 200), are important Sceptics, and preserve for us valuable fragments of ancient dialectic. Cicero gives us the results of his Greek studies at Athens and Rhodes—a summary of the school traditions of the time.

3. *Neo-Platonism*.—The last phase of Greek Philosophy exhibits its struggle to define its relation to spiritual religion. The polytheism of Greece had no essential influence upon its Philosophy except the negative one of furnishing the best possible condition for free, untrammelled speculation. Transferred by the Alexandrian conquests in the Orient, Greek thought came necessarily into collision with forms of religion which were substantial inasmuch as they contained the entire spiritual life of their peoples. Alexandria was a kind of focus wherein centred the East and the West. The implicit unity of religion, politics, art, and philosophy, which had been found in the Persian Empire (Parseeism, Judaism, Egyptian Mysteries, &c.) had to be comprehended and assimilated by Greek Philosophy, now that the West had subdued the East.

First are the Jewish Greek philosophers, of whom Philo (A. D. 30) is the chief; his doctrine of the “Logos” is the first interpretation of the doctrine of divine incarnation. Next come the New-Pythagorean eclectics, foremost of whom is Apollonius of Tyana (A. D. 50). Numenius of Apamea (A. D. 150) elaborates the idea of a Logos. Finally Neo-Platonism transforms the entire fabric of Philosophy, and subordinates it to a new method. Its principle is the transcendence of the Deity. Ammonius Saccas (A. D. 175–250), who was educated in the Christian faith but returned to the Greek stand-point, is the founder of this movement. Among his pupils are Plotinus and the two Origenes (one of them the Christian).

Plotinus (204–269 A. D.), developed the doctrine in a system-

atic form, teaching that the primordial essence, the original unity (*ἔν*), or the Good, is neither reason nor cognizable by reason. From its emanation arises its image, which is the *νοῦς*, or mind, which in its endeavor to behold the One produces its image = the soul. From the latter arises the body, which is the image of the soul. Thus descending through degrees of reflection by means of images, the lowest depth is reached in matter, which is farthest removed from the One. From its theoretical concept, that of emanation, arises its practical doctrine that the business of man is to return to God, from whom he, as a sensuous being, has estranged himself. This return can be accomplished by, first asceticism, secondly by philosophic (discursive) thought, and thirdly by ecstatic intuition, through which the soul unites itself again with God and becomes the One. Porphyry (A. D. 233-304) his disciple, edited and published the works of Plotinus in six *Enneads*. His own introduction to the *Categories* of Aristotle is so valuable that it is usually printed with the *Organon*. It exercised a great influence on the thought of the Middle Ages, a passage from it giving rise to the celebrated controversy of Nominalism and Realism. Jamblichus of Chalcis (A. D. 330) a pupil of Porphyry, founded the Syrian School of Neo-Platonism, and, intoxicated with the influence of Orientalism, posited an absolute One above the already transcendent One of Plotinus. The absolute One was wholly without attributes, not even being the Good, as Plotinus had made it.

With Proclus (A. D. 411-485) who, at Athens elaborated the whole body of Greek Philosophy and gave it the form of his own system, Greek Philosophy ends. His system resembles that of Plotinus, being a descending system of triads. Boethius (A. D. 470-525), through his *Consolatio* and his translation of a portion of the *Organon* and his commentary on Porphyry, transmitted almost all that was known of Greek Philosophy by the Christians in the West for several centuries.

CHAPTER III. THE PHILOSOPHY IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.

1. *Gnosticism*.—Within Christianity, Gnosticism arose in the 2d century, as an attempt to construct a religious philosophy on the Christian basis. The Gnostics investigated the relation of Christianity to Judaism, and next its relations to the Hellenic religions. Valentinus (A. D. 160) was the most important representative of Gnosticism. He connected the doctrine of Christ's incarnation with a system of supramundane *Æons* (evidently

influenced by Parseeism.) The Nous was the "only-begotten," and from it came the Logos. More and more this doctrine (Gnosticism) became involved with Orientalism, until it degenerated to a form of Māgianism, and entirely corrupted practical life. Origen and Clement of Alexandria also strove to assimilate some of the doctrines of Gnosticism.

2. *Orthodoxy*.—After Christianity had assumed a definite form through the action of the Council of Nice, more attention was given to the work of demonstrating its dogmas on philosophic grounds. Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa, St. Augustine (A. D. 354–430), Synesius (A. D. 375–430), Æneas of Gaza, Philoponus, and more especially the pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, are important names in this connection. In St. Augustine may be found, at least in germ, the entire body of Christian Philosophy and Theology. Christian mysticism is generally based on the writings of the Areopagite, and their translation into Latin by Scotus Erigena in the ninth century gave rise to Scholasticism.

3. *Scholasticism*.—The teachers of the seven liberal arts (*trivium* and *quadrivium*) in the cloister schools of Charlemagne were called *doctores scholastici*—whence the term "scholasticism" as applied to the system of philosophy within the church during the middle ages. The whole ground of the relation between religion and philosophy had to be brought under discussion and the attitude of the church readjusted toward the numerous questions which the new intellectual activity of the time brought forth. Belonging to the first period of Scholasticism which is characterized by the assimilation of Aristotelian logic and Neo-Platonic principles by the doctrine of the church, the most noted names are Johannes Scotus Erigena (843–877), whose translation of *Dionysius* has been referred to, Anselm (1033–1109) the "arch-realist," Roscellinus (1092) the most famous of the early nominalists, Abelard (1079–1142) the so-called "conceptualist," William of Champeaux (1070–1121) Gilbertus Porretanus, (1154) Amalrich of Bena (1206). The disputes between nominalism and realism which arose in this period generally resulted in favor of realism, especially after the time of Roscellinus who had been so bold as to apply the nominalistic doctrine to the dogma of the Trinity and to deny the unity of the Godhead. Only individuals exist really, and a general name has nothing objective corresponding to it but is only *flatus vocis* (an expression of Anselm.) Hence there are three Gods and the Godhead is a mere concept or name without

reality. The Council of Soissons (1092) forced him to recant this doctrine, and nominalism although it continued to exist was silent until William of Occam used it to overthrow all scholastic philosophy in the interest of faith. In Porphyry's Introduction translated by Boethius (as already mentioned) occurs the passage which occasioned the disputes of nominalism and realism: "whether genera and species have substantial existence or exist solely in our thoughts, whether material or immaterial" he declines to say ("*dicere recusabo*"). The followers of Plato held the doctrine *universalia ante rem*, (in God), *in re*, (in nature), and *post rem* (in our minds) and this doctrine was endorsed by all the realists while the nominalists or conceptualists taught *universalia post rem* only. Nominalism was closely connected with the rise of independent thinking and the study of nature, but inevitably led to scepticism through the inadequacy of its principle to explain spiritual existences.

The conquests of the Saracens aroused and united Christian Europe for several centuries and finally produced the reaction of the Crusades. In like manner the intellectual activity of the Arabians as it developed in the schools and universities challenged the sluggish intellects of Christendom and incited them to strenuous efforts. The oriental principle of abstract unity in the Godhead which had made its appearance in the early Christian Church and had been finally eliminated by violence after the Council of Nice, made its way through the preaching of Ebionitic Christians in Arabia into a new religion—Mohammedanism.* A rigid monotheism sprang up and became a menace to Christianity. Its philosophic thinkers quite naturally had a proclivity to adopt the emanation theory and to deny permanence of identity to the individual. In the eighth and ninth centuries and much earlier, Nestorian Syrians lived among the Arabs and introduced a knowledge of philosophy, especially of Neo-Platonism and the system of Aristotle. They translated first into Syriac and later into Arabic the works of Aristotle and of his most eminent commentators. These were used by Alkendi (870) Alfarabi (900) Avicenna (Ibn Sina) (980–1036) Averroes (Ibn Roschd) (—1198) and through their instrumentality Western Europe was impelled again to the study of Aristotle. The unity of system in the Peripatetic philosophy quite fascinated the Arabian intellect already occupied with the same principle in its religion. The great com-

*(Sprenger: *Das Leben und die Lehre des Mohammad*, Berlin, 1868.)

mentators, Avicenna and Averroes accordingly followed Alexander of Aphrodisias in his interpretation of the *De anima*, and limited immortality to the world-soul which should find its particular existence in individual men, capable, it is true, of cognizing universal ideas through participation in this general intelligence, but who could not survive as individuals the death of the body, inasmuch as the faculties of perception, memory, appetite and reflection (νοῦς παθητικός) are corporeal. Christian thought was aroused and it grappled resolutely the question whether any particular individual can be immortal, that is, whether the individual can be universal and particular at the same time. This added to the zeal with which realists combatted nominalism. Is the universal or generic only a fiction of the mind? If it is really existent, is it immanent in or separable from the particular individual? If the latter is the case then individuals are merely phenomenal and there is no immortality, and the whole fabric of Christianity is destroyed at once.

The discussion of these questions was no idle quibbling, as is sometimes supposed, but an altogether serious affair in those days. The Christian dogmas establishing the Trinity, human responsibility and immortality had hitherto been accepted on faith and few thinkers had arisen since the downfall of the Western Empire, with any inclination to follow the direction of St. Augustine and attempt to gain theoretical insight into the dogma. Against pagan religions such as Christendom had encountered in the north and west there was no need of a metaphysical system for there was none to oppose. But with the Moslem came a philosophical system as complete as Aristotelianism and skillfully interpreted in the interests of pantheism. There arose a series of great minds who made it their work to master Aristotle and to interpret him in the interests of Christianity: Alexander of Hales (—1245), Bonaventura (—1274), Albertus Magnus (1193–1280), his pupil Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), and Duns Scotus (—1308). Of these, Aquinas is the greatest, and through him Christian theology gained a consistent, systematic form. Aristotle was thoroughly studied and each portion of his system explained in the light of the whole; he accordingly became the great pillar of the church and was compared to John the Baptist, being “*precursor Christi in naturabilis*.”

Roger Bacon (1214–1292) and William of Occam (—1347) did not participate in the prevailing movement—the former being a

great experimental physicist born before his proper time, and the latter being the invincible opponent of the current logical realism and the first nominalist who succeeded in sustaining himself against the current schools. He used his nominalistic arguments against the philosophical basis of realism and not against the dogmas of the church, inasmuch as he denied the authority of reason altogether and proclaimed that of faith. Scholasticism rapidly went down during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

CHAPTER IV. MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

1. *Translators and Commentators.*—Upon the downfall of the Eastern Empire many learned Greeks came from Constantinople westward and kindled at Florence and elsewhere the direct study of Plato and Aristotle, thus dispensing with the commentators whose views had been taken hitherto as genuine interpretations. Distinguished translators and original commentators of this epoch were Gemistus Pletho, Bessarion, Ficinus, George of Trebizond, Theodore Gaza, Pomponatius, Scaliger, Zabarella and Melanchthon. The epoch closes with naturalistic opponents of the traditional philosophy of the schools: Nicolaus Cusanus (1401–1464), Jerome Cardan (1501–1576), Telesius (1508–1588), Patritius (1529–1597), Ramus (1517–1572.)

2. *Emancipation from Authority.*—The epoch of emancipation from authority opens with three great names: Giordano Bruno (1548–1600), Francis Bacon (1561–1626) and René Descartes (1596–1650). The first of these, Bruno, developed the doctrine of Nicolaus Cusanus and Copernicus, in an anti-ecclesiastical direction, having quitted the Dominican order. He left Naples for Geneva, and afterwards lived in France and England; after remaining several years in Germany he returned to Italy where he was burned at the stake, after several years imprisonment, by order of the Inquisition. Bruno's system attempts to reconstruct the theory of the world in accordance with the view of Copernicus. His doctrine of monads anticipates much that is found in the system of Leibnitz and his optimism is identical. Lord Bacon's great merit was in his attempt to separate natural science from religion so as to allow the former to develop with freedom. He is the founder of empirical philosophy rather than induction in natural science, although he laid the greatest stress upon the value of useful discoveries. Thomas Hobbes (1588–1624) developed Bacon's principle in the direction of politics, favoring an absolute monarchy. It is somewhat singular that, while he was

an extreme nominalist theoretically, Hobbes should have been a realist in regard to the State, characterizing its generic existence as a "mortal god" and making it the substantial existence and that of the individual only contingent. Descartes completed the emancipation of philosophy from scholasticism by bringing its doctrines to the test of immediate consciousness and throwing off the authority of tradition. His distinction between spirit and matter was so sharp that his followers had much labor to explain their connection. Geulinx held that on the occasion of each act of the will God effects the corresponding motion of the body, and Malebranche explained sense-perception by the doctrine that we see all things in God.

Spinoza (1632-1677) avoided the Cartesian dualism altogether by his one substance which has the two attributes, thought and extension. He excluded all finitude from his substance making all limitation to be negation. In the place of arbitrary free will which had been emphasized so strongly especially by Duns Scotus, he laid great stress on the necessary nature of truth (*sub specie aternitatis*) and excluded all final causes from God. He would seem to deny immortality to man or personality to God by his principle and yet in the fifth book of his *Ethics* he portrays human freedom as intellectual love of God, and makes this love reciprocal. His use of the geometrical method of definitions and axioms shows the influence of the reactionary spirit of the time, which repudiated dogmatic authority and sought the certainty of scientific demonstration.

3. *Empiricism and Eclecticism.*—John Locke (1632-1704) in his "*Essay Concerning the Human Understanding*" attempted to take a critical survey of the power of the mind to cognize truth and thus to determine its limits. The origin of our ideas, is accordingly, his chief theme. Innate ideas he repudiates and makes the mind to be a blank tablet before the activity of sense perception furnishes it with ideas of the external world. "Knowledge is the perception of the connection and agreement or of the disagreement and repugnancy of several ideas." He adduces a proof of the existence of God and regards the immateriality of the soul as probable. Berkeley (1685-1783) drew out the ultimate consequences of Locke's doctrine in a system of "Universal Immaterialism" denying the existence of the material world as well as of abstract ideas and making (like Malebranche) nature to be a regular succession of ideas called forth by God. Pierre Bayle

(1647–1706) author of the famous pantheistic dictionary, Cudworth (1617–1688) author of the “Intellectual System,” Henry More (1614–1687) Platonist and mystic, Gassendi (1592–1655) reviver of the atomism of Democritus and Epicurus, Grotius (1583–1645) and Puffendorf (1623–1694) writers upon the law of nations—are important names in this epoch. Samuel Clarke (1675–1729) a disciple of Newton and Locke, defended his masters against Leibnitz.

4. *Mysticism or Theosophy*.—German philosophy previous to Leibnitz was chiefly theosophic. The teacher of Thomas Aquinas, and the first to present the entire philosophy of Aristotle in a systematic order, illustrated by Arabian commentary and interpreted in harmony with Christian doctrine, was Albertus Magnus, a Swabian by birth, coming from the same country which afterwards produced Schelling and Hegel. While he taught at Paris or more probably at Cologne, it is supposed that Meister Eckhart of Strassburg (1250–1329) attended his lectures and received the first impulse to that wonderful theosophic speculation which afterwards gave rise to the Rhenish school of mystics, prominent among whom were Tauler of Strassburg (1300–1361), Heinrich Suso of Constance (1300–1365) John Ruysbrœk of Grunthal (1293–1381), the Teutonic Knight of Frankfort whose “*Theologia Germanica*” discovered by Luther, gave so much impulse to later mysticism. Thomas à Kempis in the following century (1380–1471) may be mentioned as belonging to this school, and Nicolaus Cusanus of Treves (1401–1464) forms a connecting link between theosophic speculation and the later metaphysics. The profound speculations of Albertus Magnus and Aquinas were popularized and preached at large by Eckhart and his followers. Not content with the limits which had been placed by Aquinas and adopted by the church, distinguishing the dogmas that may be demonstrated from those which transcend human reason, Eckhart boldly pushed his speculations into the dogma of the Trinity, and seizing its expression of the concrete universal (i. e. a unity in different individuals) built upon it a comprehensive system of thought, as elaborate and consistent in its details as the great cathedral begun at Cologne in the year of his birth. In this theosophic system may be found all the cardinal doctrines of the latest bloom of German philosophy or at least their germs. His hearers learned to demand for the intellect its participation in divine doctrines, and a wonderful illumination

appeared in subtle minds—the piety of the intellect was attained. Man not only can will the divine which he receives implicitly as dogma of faith, but he can also think the divine and, indeed, according to Eckhart, he can theoretically become a participator in divine knowledge.

God's personality as revealed in the Trinity is the basis of his system. God's necessity to exist, hence to realize or reveal himself is involved in the fact that He is to be a person and Self-conscious. He makes himself an object to himself, and without this objectivity to himself He would remain a mere abstract possibility of existence, and not be the living God. This self-knowledge unfolds as the Trinity: I. God the father (the subject knowing): II. God the son (object known); III. God the spirit, the return or reconciliation, or mutual reunion. God beholds himself as the real object of his knowledge. Such act of beholding is the creation of the object beheld—it is nature—the world in time and space—the Son eternally begotten. His object as nature exists in externality as separate from Him through this act of diremption involved in knowing. But His act of recognition of himself in it (i. e., in nature) brings out of it the image of himself, i. e., intelligent souls who aspire again to their source, and love and recognize the Father. Thus out of the abyss of God's "not me" involved in his consciousness, arises the creation ascending through all its stages from inorganic matter, plant, animal, to man, in whose immortal soul, gifted with free will and speculative intellect, He sees His own image. Thus the whole universe of stellar systems may be regarded by Eckhart's theory as existent for the evolution of rational souls.

In this bold system he transcended the limits set by the Romanic Scholasticism. For this he was summoned before the inquisition (in 1327) and his doctrines condemned in a bull. To take the chief mystery of theology and expound it as the solution to all problems, could not be allowed by the Latin mind. It savored of Pantheism, from which the church was just then happily escaped through the thinking of Thomas Aquinas. Indeed this interpretation of the Trinity has been generally denounced by theologians, Protestant as well as Catholic, for Pantheism. If, however, one defines Pantheism as the doctrine which denies the personality of its highest principle—setting up for example a blind force, or principle of evolution, or abstract mundane intelligence—then Eckhart's system is not Pantheism. It holds in

fact with all Christian theology that the Absolute is a person, and that the world of nature is his free creation, whose purpose is the production of His image. It is, to use the words of Richard Rothe, the conversion of His pure not-me (or chaos) into a manifestation of Him, and thus the realization of the fullness and blessedness of His own divine being in a creation independent of Him.

But Eckhart held (like Rothe) the existence of an eternal world of ideas in God as well as a temporal world of creatures in time and space. This is essential, moreover, since God's creation of an image of himself were incomplete without a return out of the limits of time and space to pure ideas again. Without the contemplation of pure ideas He would remain beholding His opposite, or the world of finitudes limited and necessitated in time and space. "God has externalized his inmost essence," says Eckhart. "The end of all creatures is to be soul and to cognize God." Theosophy always makes this mystic union of the soul with God the destination of man, and for this reason lays great stress on internal contemplation, and undervalues external forms and ceremonies, which the church is obliged, however, to employ not only for the sake of the non-speculative ordinary minds, but for the reason that it is essential for each man as a denizen of the world to stand in practical relation to his fellow men. This relation involves participation in the common recognition of the Highest, and its celebration through visible spectacles as in the church service. Hence it has happened that Theosophists have been regarded as heretics in their day.

Whatever view may be held of the orthodoxy of Eckhart's system, it is certain that he prepared the way for the Reformation by his ethics, and for the later German Philosophy by his metaphysics.

Holding a similar relation to his time so far as doctrines were concerned, came Jacob Böhme of Gärlicz (1575-1624) contemporary with Descartes and Lord Bacon, and called *Philosophus Teutonicus*, because, being ignorant of Latin, he wrote in German. Although a poor shoemaker he was one of the subtlest minds that Germany has produced, and numbered among his followers Henry More, John Pordage, Pierre Poiret, and more recently St. Martin, Baader, and Schelling. His insight into the necessity of the negative in the highest principles was his chief *aperçu*. The Absolute should be a spiritual activity, and

hence involve self-opposition, self-determination, self-negation in it. While Lord Bacon proclaimed the English stand-point for modern times, Böhme proclaimed the German. These two individualities, as different as one may find, agree in this that they both find the content of thinking mind not in the dogma but in concrete being—the former in the world of time and space, the latter in the immediate internal life existing for each man in his own soul. Like Eckhart Böhme finds in the Trinity his highest principle and the solution of all mysteries. His “chief yea” is the attempt to grasp all in an absolute unity—all antitheses are reconciled in God. The holy Trinity is to be shown in all things and all things are its revelation; all things are by and through it. The universe is to him one divine life and revelation of God in all things, so that from the essence of God is born the totality of all qualities and forces, as the eternally begotten Son who reveals himself in those forces. The internal unity of this light, or divine essence, with the substance of the forces, is the Spirit.

Johann Scheffler (1624–1677) or “Angelus Silesius” (*The Cherubinic Wanderer*) was born the year of Böhme’s death. He continues the line of mystics, and celebrates in the poetic form of short verses doctrines identical to those of Eckhart and Böhme. God’s need of his image in man to reflect His essence, and man’s need of God to develop in him His essence. “God loves himself alone, and thus becomes His Other in His beloved Son.” “God’s son has been for aye and yet is first brought forth to-day.” “Thyself maketh the time, its works thy senses be; but checkest Thou their unrest, then thou from time art free;” “I know without me God cannot a moment live; If I to naught should turn, He too would death receive.” His expression of the necessity of God’s image seems quite extravagant unless one attends carefully to the philosophic content of the doctrine, and sees in it only an expression of the doctrine of the Trinity as necessarily involved in the most important of all principles, that of the *Personality of the Absolute*. This is the kernel of all German mysticism and Theosophy. Personality involves consciousness and will, each of these involve self-objectivity or the contemplation of self, and thereby the actualization of self; hence creation as a progressive manifestation of the Absolute from the pure empty externality (time and space or chaos) up to internality—the immortal soul which completes the “Image” of the Absolute, by

reflecting God in its intellect (Truth) and will (the Good). (Schelling's Mysticism and Theosophy will be mentioned later).

Franz von Baader (1765-1841) is a genuine theosophist of the old school. Contemporary with Schelling and influenced by the study of the latter, but more especially by the study of Böhme and St. Martin, he held that our knowledge is a participation (*conscientia*) in the divine knowing. The immanent vital process of God reveals him and in the first place makes him tri-personal; furthermore in his creation he creates and comes into final union with his image which must be distinguished from him in his eternal Selfhood.

In Richard Rothe (1799-1867), theosophy becomes identical with the philosophical movement as developed to its highest form in Hegel.

These are the most noteworthy names among the German theosophists. Attention must be called to the fact that difference of opinion exists as to the definition of pantheism, and that all theosophy may be regarded as pantheism by strict theologians. Hence there is a struggle on the part of educated theosophists to avoid the appearance of pantheism by separating the creation of the world from the self-revelation in the Trinity. This appears even in Eckhart occasioned by his collision with the theology of the church as developed by Thomas Aquinas. It is more clearly manifest in Baader; and in Rothe perhaps we have the clear escape from any tinge of pantheism.

The category of necessity is sometimes not carefully discriminated into internal or logical necessity and external necessity or Fate; and again internal necessity is not distinguished into unconscious self-determination or evolution, and conscious self-determination—freewill. Necessity of efficient causes is Fate, necessity of final causes is freedom. If as Lessing taught, thinking, willing and creating are one and identical in God, then his self-consciousness is his eternal act of creation and creation is inseparable from God, as self conscious Person. But it constrains Him no more than the consciousness of self constrains man and destroys his freedom. Self consciousness is the complete realization of freedom for in it all externality appears as a mere product of the self-activity. Thus two kinds of pantheism may be distinguished, (a) materialistic and (b) theosophic: (a) materialistic pantheism according to this view would include the doctrine which holds God to be a blind, unconscious force vitalizing

nature and thus making conscious being to be merely phenomenal and not essential or immortal. All things would thus originate from an unconscious principle and return to it. (b) But theosophic pantheism is the opposite of the former and holds the first principle to be a self-conscious Person from whom nature eternally proceeds; out of nature proceeds man as a return to the absolute through his thinking and free willing. Thus in the former pantheism fate or blind force is the highest; in the latter, free spirit. The latter is called pantheism solely for the reason that it connects the creation of nature necessarily with God. Those who hold the latter, disclaim the charge of pantheism on the ground that the manifestation of God does not limit Him any more than self-consciousness involves fatalism. God's contemplation of his image is not only a creation of that image but a process of annulment of all inadequateness in the image and hence the process of change and evanescence going on in all the lower forms of nature.

5. *Dogmatism.*—Theosophy becomes metaphysics in Leibnitz, (1646–1716) whom we find holding the same relation to the English and French Philosophers as his Theosophic countrymen had done in earlier times. Leibnitz is usually called the founder of German Philosophy, and certainly in the writings of his follower Wolff, his doctrines became systematized, and held sway down to the time of Kant. Indeed in Herbart's system some of its essential features are revived, and through it a wide school of recent thinkers receives its principles from Leibnitz. His Monadology presents his point of view in sharp and clear outline. Over against the mechanism of Descartes, he sets up the system of monads, which have no mechanical relation to each other, but only the ideal or psychological one of representing each other—each monad mirroring in itself all the others (the entire world of monads appearing in each)—the macrocosm in the microcosm. Thus there is unity and harmony without mechanical constraint, and independent individuality is preserved. In the doctrine of pre-established harmony, the monad of monads appears as God, the absolute person in His relation to the world of souls. Each monad is a potential soul, and unfolds into the highest by its own activity.

In their freedom the individual monads are the image of the absolute monad who in turn recognizes himself in them. This

mutual recognition is the highest principle. Independent existences in complete unity or harmony suggest the idea of the Trinity again, which is evidently the underlying thought in Leibnitz's system, just as it had been the central principle of the theosophic systems of his countrymen. Independent persons and yet one in a mystic sense, is the paradox which when seen in its necessity becomes the luminous principle that explains all. In opposition to the sensism of Locke who holds up the principle of passivity or emptiness of the *Ego* (*tabula rasa*), Leibnitz proclaims the native spontaneity of the intellect and its self-generation of universal ideas. "*Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu*" says Locke. Leibnitz adds "*nisi ipse intellectus*" and founds the principle which through Kant becomes the corner-stone of the great structure of the nineteenth century.

Wolff of Breslau (1679-1754) combined into a system the doctrines of Leibnitz with a truly Aristotelian spirit. From his labors arose the Leibnitzo-Wolffian school which prevailed until the advent of the Critical Philosophy. Wolff made the first reduction of philosophy to an encyclopædic form.

6. *Scepticism*.—David Hume (1711-1776) is the point of departure of the chief systems which have appeared during the last hundred years. His most important earlier years were spent in France, and his strongest mental tendencies bear the impress of French culture. Taking the standpoint of Locke that all perceptions are either impressions (of the senses) or ideas, he finds all ideas reducible to copies of sense-impressions, "they are the faint images of such impressions in thinking and reasoning." The idea of cause and effect "is derived from experience, which, presenting us with certain objects, constantly conjoined with each other produces such a habit of surveying them in that relation that we cannot without a sensible violence survey them in any other." His ethical doctrine is that "sympathy of man with man causes the approbation of an action performed in the interest of the common welfare." No inference from empirical data to the nature of the soul or the existence of God is permissible. Hume's influence on English, French and German thought has been immense, and is due to his unparalleled clearness of statement, more than to the essence of his doctrines.

The French philosophy of the eighteenth century was a reaction against church and State. A sweeping movement towards

individualism and scepticism, it rejected all realized forms of reason whether embodied in institutions—the church, the State and civil society—or existing in a systematic form as theology or philosophy. It placed all validity in the immediate judgment of the individual, and private opinion was to have all rights except that of doubting the infallibility of the principle of private judgment. Bayle, Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau, Condillac, Diderot, D'Alembert, Robinet, (who anticipated Darwinism and the Spencerian "evolution"), La Mettrie, and Baron Holbach, individually and collectively attacked every phase of realized intelligence in the interest of the formal freedom of thought. In France this movement culminated in political revolution. Germany participated in it in its own way. Lessing commenced the reaction, and the war for literary independence of France. But the true reassertion of the German principle of thought is to be found in the philosophy of Kant, which contains the French negative principle within it, although annulled and subordinated.

7. *Criticism.*—With Kant (1724–1804) therefore begins the career of the highest phase of German philosophy. Kant pondered the scepticism of Hume, and sought a principle elevated above the dogmatical stand-point and, for this reason, unassailable by scepticism. Armed with this, the Teutonic principle should be triumphant over scepticism and abstract revolutionary protest whether British or French. Indeed it should subsume all negative positions of doubt or scepticism under a higher principle. So great a design was to be the fruition of modern philosophy. On this critical standpoint, securely placed, one shall no longer dread the polemics of shifting systems. Kant essayed to take such an inventory of the possessions and capacities of the mind as would forever set at rest all dogmatic polemics.

Locke's inventory was not exhaustive or trustworthy; he had not sufficient power of inward seeing. Kant pierces the obscurity, and beholds the problem of cognition in its entirety. The mind is both receptive (as regards sensation) and spontaneous or self-active (as regards the origination of its general forms; time, space, the laws of causality and the other general predicates which enable the mind to give unity to the multiplicity of its impressions). Its act of judging, i. e. of predicating, is an act of unifying or bringing a manifold into a unity, and this act is always an act of reflection; that is to say, it is an act of attention, not to an outward object, but to the mental activity by which

feeling, sensation and sense-perception are performed. Sensation or feeling which underlies the perception of objects, is a process and therefore consists of a series, or succession of acts. Consciousness is able to direct its attention upon this succession in its own activity, and thus to unite the elements of it, self-activity being the thread connecting them. Thus in sense-perception there is united a perception of the particular object in the present instant, now and here, with the perception of self (or the thinking activity). The self is the pure Ego—the most general concept possible—inasmuch as it involves the subject underlying all possible modifications of thought. Thus every act of cognition involves the act of reflection, that is to say, the act of self-perception—and this act is the pure spontaneity of the Ego. This self-activity which is thus related purely to itself, is the general condition of every act of knowing. Without it there may be feeling and sensation, or irritability in the organism which may give rise to impulsive reaction, but there can be no cognition whatever of the relations of one object to another, nor consciousness of self. To sum up this doctrine: cognition of relations—hence all generalization, inference or predication—depends upon cognition of self-activity. The existence of the science of mathematics, containing, as it does, truths relating to the conditions of existence which are universal and necessary, furnished Kant the clue to his system. Such *a priori* knowledge of the conditions of existence in the outer world proved incontestibly, in his view, the identity of those conditions with the forms of activity of thinking.

Thus Kant by a critical examination of the mind overthrew at once the entire fabric of systems founded on dogmatic assumptions, or empirical psychology, whether materialistic or idealistic. To the materialists he showed the spontaneity of the mind as the logical condition of any perception whatever of the external world; the mind gets at the external world only through becoming conscious in itself of the conditions (time, space, causality, etc., etc.) of the existence of that world. If these necessary conditions were not part and portion of its own essence, it could not know the world of nature. To the idealists he pointed out the exclusive application of these *a priori* conditions to the content of experience, and demonstrated the futility of attempting to apply the categories of the understanding to anything transcending time and space.

This attitude of Kant towards dogmatic idealism seemed hos-

tile not only toward the Leibnitz-Wolffian and the Cartesian systems, but it also seemed to threaten the basis of theology. For a speculative cognition of God, Freedom and Immortality is denied. All application of the categories to that which transcends experience is forbidden, as productive only of illusion. This is the result of the "Critique of Pure Reason." But in his "Critique of Practical Reason," Kant shows that God, Freedom and Immortality are necessarily postulated by all acts of the Will as "regulative ideas." Just as all experience presupposes an *a priori* activity in the mind, generating the essential conditions of said experience, so every act of the Will presupposes the necessary existence of God, Freedom and Immortality as its logical condition. Although we cannot theoretically establish the existence of these objects which transcend the forms of the theoretic intellect, Time, Space, Causality, &c., yet every act or deed of man asserts them. In this doctrine of Kant the meaning and significance of "theoretical" is limited to the act of subsumption of perceptions ("intuitions") under conceptions ("or categories.") With this definition Kant stands upon solid ground. We cannot perceive immediately objects which transcend the laws of experience. It would destroy these objects to predicate of them quantity, quality, causality, and modality. And yet Kant may be said to have established these objects philosophically. He analyzed the understanding and found it impossible to derive those ideas from it; but a similar analysis of the will discovered them. Surely both of these analytical processes were theoretical. Why then speak of the illusory nature of a knowledge of God, freedom and immortality?

The speculative spirit of Germany, aroused to its utmost intensity by the critiques of Kant, refused to rest satisfied within the barriers which he had set up. The systems of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel followed as attempts to re-adjust the speculative attitude of the mind toward the infinite. Kant's influence penetrated into every realm of thought, and its effects are discernible alike in the materialistic and idealistic systems of the day. Even the greatest work of art of modern times, Goethe's *Faust*,* portrays the collision of Scepticism with institutions and civilization—the problem that the French Revolution suggested. The result of *Faust's* investigations is that nothing can be known

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(the conclusion of the Critique of Pure Reason) and he turns in his despair to the Epicurean enjoyment of the world. He finds however practically (second part of Faust) that the institutions of society are all needed (conclusion of the Critique of Practical Reason) and thus learns through his will the postulates that he could not establish theoretically.

Distinguished followers of Kant who were not founders of systems were Reinhold, Schiller the poet, Schultz, Bouterwek, Krug, Tennemann, Buhle and others. Distinguished opponents were Schultze, (*Ænesidemus*) and Jacobi. From the latter sprang Fries, who blended the doctrines of Kant and Jacobi. The genesis of the Post-Kantian systems may be clearly seen, if one will bear in mind the fact that Kant obtains his transcendental ideas (God, Freedom, Immortality) not through an analysis of the intellect but of the will, and that this may be regarded still as a theoretical analysis. It will result that his followers will lay stress on this point. Since each and every act of the will implies the reality of God, Freedom and Immortality according to Kant, it will be the attempt of later philosophizing to show the presupposition of these ideas under the theoretical activity. For the result of the theoretical investigation is—as Fichte (1762–1814) shows—that all cognition is a self-activity which perceives only its own self-activity. This moreover can easily be derived from the Critique of Pure Reason. Then it follows that the theoretical activity is conditioned by the will, and therefore presupposes the existence of the transcendent objects (God, immortality, &c.) which the will presupposes.

8. *German Philosophy After Kant.* — Fichte's "Science of Knowledge" attempts a strict deduction of the pure intuitions and categories of the mind from the principle of the Ego (self-identity) and under his searching analysis there disappears all that had remained of the sensuous standpoint of empirical psychology as developed by Locke and Condillac, and with it the external world of experience likewise vanishes as something independent of, or co-ordinate with, the Ego. The only objective world left to Fichte is the moral world. Nature almost entirely disappears except as a postulate of morality. As the will becomes all in all, and clear consciousness alone is recognized as valid, the one-sidedness of this system produces the reaction of Schelling (1775–1854) who does justice to the phase of the world wherein unconsciousness still prevails and

wherein the conscious will (morality) has not yet developed. The philosophy of Schelling consequently lays great stress on Art (æsthetics), the philosophy of nature, mythology, religion, and the realms wherein the consciousness of freedom has not as yet fully developed. While Fichte lays stress solely on the world of free, spontaneous activity, and accordingly makes ethics the centre of his system, Schelling is always engaged in tracing the self-evolution of unconscious organism, whether in nature or human history. The centre of his system is therefore Art, wherein the unconscious reaches its completest expression. His method led him to the study of Theosophy, and through him the study of Bœhme was revived.

Schelling's school includes the distinguished Theosophist Baader (as has been already mentioned) and the naturalists Oken, Carus, Oersted, Steffens, Burdach, the theoiogians Schleiermacher, Eschenmayer, Blasche, Goerres, besides Solger, Stahl the jurist, Schubert the cosmologist, Jacob Wagner, Krause, Esenbeck, and others.

Unconscious evolution is the opposite of conscious method. It was quite natural that Schelling's philosophy should be unsystematic and fragmentary, everywhere throwing deep glances, but nowhere finding the all-connecting thread which is seen only by reflection on self-activity and is the acme of self-consciousness. Hence arose a new philosophy, that of Hegel (1770-1831) which strove to grasp all the content of nature and mind with self-conscious method. He undertook to deal with Schelling's breadth, and reduce it to Fichte's unity and strictness of system. He designed to interpret nature and history in their evolution by means of a corresponding *a priori* deduction or evolution of the ideas of the necessary conditions of reality in time and space. It was only a further development of the logical result of Kant's system.

If the mind's own form (time, space, causality, etc.) is the logical condition of all reality in nature and history, then an *a priori* evolution of these ideas one from another, if found valid and seen to be necessary and universal, will likewise prove to be objective and the law of reality. This is the famous "unity of thought and being" which is not, properly considered, anything paradoxical. For it does not mean that a so-called "mere idea" i. e. a fancy, or mental image, or arbitrary thought, is objective, but only that universal and necessary ideas are objective as well as

subjective, and not only necessities of thought but also necessities of being. Mathematics enunciates the logical conditions of the existence of matter and motion. When a mathematical proposition is demonstrated it is seen to be universal and necessary; in other words to be the necessary condition of all existence in space. Thus the metaphysical ideas of causality, substantiality, force, form, the principle of contradiction, etc., are seen to be logical conditions of phenomena in time and space—the *a priori* thought being the conditioning form of reality. Kant showed that these were the necessary subjective forms of experience and hence of all phenomena that we can know. The entire world in time and space thus necessarily conforms to these ideas. Now of course our psychological evolution of these necessary ideas cannot be other than the evolution of the conditions of existence of phenomena in time and space. A denial of this position can be established only by showing that there are no such universal and necessary ideas, for to admit them is to admit their necessary validity as conditions of reality, and such denial would destroy the science of mathematics. Moreover, it is possible to show that such denial is inconceivable, and that no one can think of the opposite of one of these ideas, although he may frame a denial in words.

One may, after the example of Stuart Mill, deny universality and necessity to the proposition that two and two make four, asserting that it may make five in the mind of some being, thus annulling the principle of contradiction. If two and two make five and “five” is a word signifying one more than four or two more than three, then two and three are made identical and the principle of contradiction destroyed. In fact in the very denial of the objective validity of what is necessary in thought, there is an affirmation of the very thing denied. For in such denial one affirms the objective possibility of existence under other conditions than that enunciated in the necessary idea, and the validity of such affirmation of objective possibility or impossibility is the very thing which he attempted to deny. The old elenchus attributed to Eubulides of Miletus, called “The Liar,” is the type of this self-contradictory argument. It asserts a universal negative which annuls even the formal statement in which it is made. To say “No one ever tells the truth” is to make a negative content so general that it contradicts the form of the assertion and thus

proves self-nugatory. If the assertion is true, it subsumes itself and thus contradicts itself.

Hegel traversed the entire ground of his system in his first great work "The Phenomenology of Mind," tracing up the internal evolution of the great phases of human thought as they had appeared in history and showing their connection and logical necessity. He afterwards unfolded this into (a) Logic, or the Science of Pure Thought, unfolding dialectically the definitions and relations of all general ideas such as quality, quantity, difference, form, cause, etc.; (b) Philosophy of Nature including the science of the conditions of reality in the natural world and their application to actually existing things; (c) Philosophy of Spirit or Science of Man as exhibited in human history, including an explanation through the idea of freedom, of all his institutions, family, society and state, and his systems of art, religion and science; together with an account of the obscure phenomena wherein mind still struggles impotently under its physical conditions—sleep, dreaming, somnambulism, insanity, racial characteristics, instinct, etc.; and the relation of consciousness to mere animal life; developing positive grounds for the immortality of the soul.

With Hegel, therefore, German speculation is supposed to reach the point of complete reconciliation with the world and recognition of its forms. It would explain history as the development of conscious freedom; art as the portrayal of it to the senses; religion as the revelation of it in its spiritual relation to the will, the Christian religion being regarded as the absolute form of religion. The whole circle, pure thought, nature, spirit, being embraced in one system, we arrive at a completion of a cycle of philosophy, corresponding to the encyclopædic completeness which Aristotle gave to the science of his time. Subsequent philosophic activity has been partly a popular restatement of the encyclopædic form of Hegel, partly investigation in special spheres in accordance with Hegel's dialectic method or criticisms on the same; partly a return to the stand-points of previous philosophers.

The most eminent of the school of direct expounders of Hegel are Marheineke, J. Schulze, Gans, von Henning, Hotho, Förster, Michelet, Rosenkranz, Weisse, Göschel, Erdmann and Kuno Fischer. A school of psychologists has also arisen which approximates, more or less, in methods the English and Scotch schools of empirical psychology. Its most eminent names are

J. H. Fichte, Wirth, Zeller, Ulrici, Bona Meyer, and Liebmann. Many of these thinkers commenced as adherents of Hegel and afterwards gradually withdrew their assent from his doctrines and assumed positions more or less antagonistic to them.

These three phases of the Hegelian dialectic (*a*) immediate assertion, (*b*) mediation through grounds more or less foreign to the subject, (*c*) self-mediation, through which the transition is made from the previous idea to the more concrete one which follows it—furnish the ground of this divergence. Warm adherents like Strauss and Feuerbach in their first career, dazzled by the penetration of the system into all realms of activity, cling to the dialectic with a sort of faith, and seize it as real objective evolution—a kind of development theory—and do not notice that it exhibits self-annulment of all subordinate ideas and categories in the ultimate and highest one—the idea—which is the notion of absolute self-conscious Personality. Accordingly the whole system is seized as a necessary evolution wherein unconscious impulse or principle plays the most important *role*. Hence with Strauss and Feuerbach a return is made out of the doctrine of the transcendence of conscious spiritual personality to that of Pantheistic genesis and re-absorption of the soul; and the system of Hegel as presented by its author is completely inverted.

Contemporary with Hegel appeared Schleiermacher (1768–1834) Herbart (1776–1841) and Schopenhauer (1788–1860). Schleiermacher (incited by Schelling) attempted to modify the Kantian Philosophy so as to co-ordinate its realistic and idealistic elements. He held the objectivity of the categories and allowed validity to feeling and emotion as of equal rank with conscious intellect. Schopenhauer likewise modified the Kantian doctrine and laid stress on the Practical Reason or the Will as the transcendent object or “thing-in-itself,” underlying phenomena. The theoretical faculty is made by him to be subordinate to the will and a transitory phase of the same. This world is the worst of possible worlds; a true life in it should be one of strict asceticism.

Herbart went back to Leibnitz through Wolff and influenced by Kant and Fichte, produced a subtle system of psychology, partly empirical, partly mathematical, partly metaphysical. His school has been prolific in distinguished thinkers, whose writings present a current of doctrine quite in contrast with the doctrines of the other schools that proceed from the influence of

Kant. Of these Beneke (1798–1854) was the most eminent. He omitted the mathematical and metaphysical phases of the system of Herbart, and added many valuable suggestions on the subject of the disappearance of characteristics of ideas and their reappearance in subsequent ideas, thus throwing light on the unconscious process of thought. With him empirical psychology is the basis of all philosophy and metaphysics. Among the thinkers of the school of Herbart may be counted Drobisch, Exner, Hartenstein, Steinthal, Lazarus, Waitz, Spir, and others.

The study of Aristotle has been revived in Germany to an extent almost as great as among the schoolmen; a circumstance perhaps due to the influence of Hegel, who said that Aristotle was worthy of having a special chair devoted to him in each university. In the lecture courses for the *winter semester*, 1874-5 there are reported in twenty-nine universities of Germany, nineteen special courses exclusively devoted to some work or works of Aristotle, besides numerous courses on ancient philosophy, in which Aristotle constitutes the central figure. Trendelenburg (1802–1872) is the most eminent of this German Aristotelian school, and has founded a system in which Kant's doctrines are modified through those of Aristotle. He adds to the two pure intuitions of Kant—time and space—*motion* as a third pure intuition and therewith attempts to explain the difficult problems of logic and psychology. His attitude towards Hegel is very hostile, especially to the dialectic method. Lotze deserves special mention for his original modifications of the ideas of Leibnitz and Herbart.

The present great struggle of philosophic thought in Germany is to realize in common consciousness the results of the vast systems of thought built up by its great thinkers, and to find a way from all other systems, ancient and modern, to these systems. The immense impulse given to empirical science has had its effect in withdrawing the attention from psychology and metaphysics. From the stand-point of physical science, indeed, have arisen some of the boldest materialists, such as Carl Vogt, Moleschott, and Büchner, whose principle is well summed up by one of them in the statement that "Thought is a secretion of the brain, just as bile is of the liver."

The decay of philosophical systems does not indicate a want of success on their part. The most successful system is the most exhaustive and finished one, and its establishment is fol-

lowed by a certain sense of completeness and security which enables investigators to turn their attention to special provinces, and elaborate them. This specializing tendency (notably following the appearance of Aristotle's encyclopædic system, and following in like manner that of Hegel in Germany) soon carries its devotees far away from the central principle of the system, and produces very distorted versions of it. Thus it is the very perfection of a philosophy that does most to produce divergence among its followers and their successors. This is the explanation of the present aspect of German thought, which seems fast deserting the great system that arose in the first quarter of the present century, and likely soon to lose itself in a multitude of individual points of view, or perhaps to adopt altogether the stand-point of empirical psychology.

CHAPTER VI. ITALY, FRANCE, ENGLAND AND AMERICA.

(A List of the Principal Philosophers of the Past Century.)

1. *Italy*.—Among the Italian philosophers after Vico (1668–1774) who founded the philosophy of history, are to be mentioned Galluppi (1770–1846) a psychologist influenced by the critical philosophy; Rosmini (1797–1855) founder of a new school of Idealism (also influenced by Kant); Gioberti (1801–1852) a Realist in the scholastic sense of the term, author of a system of ontology internally resembling the system of Leibnitz; Mamiani (1799—) holding the Scottish doctrine of presentative perception and of intuitional cognition of ideas; he is at present editor of *La Filosofia delle Scuole Italiane* (a journal of speculative philosophy) with a corps of co-laborers including F. Bonatelli, A. Franchetti, F. Lavarino, G. Barzellotti, P. Ragnisco, Luigi Ferri and others; A. Vera (1817—) the chief Italian disciple of Hegel has translated many of his works into French and Italian; R. Mariano, B. Spaventa, also Hegelians, Giov. Ventura, the chief representative of the scholastics, Giu. Ferrari the positivist.

2. *France*.—In France, after Condillac (1715–1780) the follower of Locke, Cabanis (1757–1808) the physiological psychologist ("thought is a secretion of the brain"), Destutt de Tracy (1754–1836), Laromiguière developed and modified the system of sensationalism especially by studying the influence of the will in the formation of ideas. Royer Collard (1763–1845) and Maine de

Biran (1766–1824), the former by the introduction of Scotch philosophy and the latter by a subtle psychological analysis, broke the influence of Condillac. Victor Cousin (1792–1867) the eclectic, is the most influential among modern French philosophers. He adopted the principle of Leibnitz, "Systems are true in what they affirm, false in what they deny," and illustrated his views by his writings on the history of philosophy. His disciples, Jouffroy (1796–1842), Janet, Remusat, Ravaisson, Haureau, Damiron and many others have won distinction at home and abroad. The Socialists, St. Simon, Fourier, Leroux, have exerted a wide influence upon the common mind. August Comte (1798–1857), the founder of the Positivist school, holds the evolutionary standpoint, making human thought to pass through the theological and metaphysical stages successively before reaching the highest stage, that of positive science, and laying great stress on the classification of the sciences in the order of necessary evolution (a) mathematics, (b) astronomy, (c) physics, (d) chemistry, (e) biology, (f) sociology; his system has been supported and promulgated chiefly by E. Littré.

3. *Great Britain.*—The history of British philosophy after Hume, is (a) that of reaction through the school of empirical psychology: the Scotch school of Thomas Reid (1710–1796), who set up the doctrine of "common sense" and substituted the doctrine of immediate presentation in sense-perception for that of representation (or perception through ideas). Dugald Stewart (1753–1828), Thomas Brown (1778–1820) and Sir William Hamilton (1788–1856) are the most important disciples of Reid. The last named has exerted a wide influence in Europe and America through his great erudition and his application of it to doctrines of present interest. His doctrine of the quantification of the predicate is claimed as a great discovery in logic; his "law of the conditioned"—that human cognition is equally incapable of seizing the infinitely great and the infinitely small—has been adopted by many thinkers, both in the interest of theology and in the interest of scepticism. (b) The Positivist school of G. H. Lewes, John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer, who write in an independent spirit, not so much influenced by the method of Comte as by the general spirit of the movement known as Positivism, is predominant in England and America. Its chief psychological doctrines rest on the basis of Locke and Hume, with, in Spencer's system, some tenets borrowed from Hamilton's doc-

trine of the unconditioned. The doctrine of evolution is also much emphasized by this school, and the writings of Charles Darwin have had a wide influence in all fields of scientific investigation in Europe and America. (c) The influence of Coleridge and Carlyle in promoting the cultivation of a more spiritual tendency in speculative and moral philosophy, should be noted. Recently an able school of thinkers has appeared, largely influenced by a study of German philosophy, and many of them are translators and interpreters of that philosophy, especially the system of Hegel. T. H. Green, editor of Hume's philosophical works; B. Jowett, translator of Plato; William Wallace, translator of Hegel's Logic; J. F. Ferrier, Henry Sidgwick, J. Sibree, Robert Flint, S. H. Hodgson, G. C. Robertson and others are to be named. A periodical, "Mind," a quarterly devoted to psychology and philosophy has been started. J. Hutchinson Stirling, the translator and expounder of Hegel ("The secret of Hegel") has given a strong impulse to the study of that great thinker.

4. *America*.—American Philosophy counts Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758) as its first representative. He was the founder of New England Calvinism, and is chiefly known for his treatise on the will. Timothy Dwight, N. W. Taylor, H. P. Tappan, Chas. G. Finney and others, have discussed the results of his system with especial view to theology. The so-called "transcendentalist" school in America arose partly from the study of Kant and his followers and especially through the study of Coleridge—who was made known in America through the efforts of James Marsh. R. W. Emerson, A. B. Alcott, Margaret Fuller, Theodore Parker and J. F. Clarke were active in founding this school. George Ripley, one of the editors of *The Dial* (1842) was instrumental in introducing Cousin to his countrymen, and the eclectic system became widely popular, and has exercised a great effect upon literary and philosophic thought here, down to the present time. O. A. Brownson, first a disciple of the eclectic system, became a profound student of Aquinas, and for many years conducted a journal in the interest of Catholicism and its school of modified scholasticism. Cousin has found other translators and expounders in C. S. Henry, O. W. Wight and Asa Mahan. Noah Porter, author of "The Human Intellect," has discussed in a temperate spirit all of the great problems of Philosophy from the standpoint of modern empirical psychology. James McCosh, the ablest of the representatives of the Scotch Philosophy, has pub-

lished "Intuitions of the Mind," and an "Exposition of the Scottish Philosophy." L. P. Hickok, with great originality and depth of speculative insight, has written various works bearing upon rational psychology and cosmology, following in the main the direction of Kant, but adopting a positive attitude in his conclusions. "The Nation," a work on the philosophy of politics, by E. Mulford, and "The Science of Thought," a work presenting the Hegelian method of treating logic as a system of psychological ontology, by C. C. Everett, give the essential views of the Hegelian school in the form of original able elaborations. A. E. Kroeger has translated and published many of Fichte's works. Tayler Lewis in his studies upon Plato, Mark Hopkins in his moral theories, R. G. Hazard in his profound investigations of the Will, Francis Bowen in his critical expositions of logic and the systems of Cousin and Hamilton, W. D. Wilson in his metaphysical theories, Joseph Haven in his text books on mental and moral philosophy, are widely known and appreciated.

The most noteworthy writers on the History of Philosophy are the following: Stanley (date of his work 1655), following closely Diogenes Laertius; Bayle (*Dict. Hist. et Crit.*, 1697); Brucker (1767—his work was abridged by Enfield, 1791); Tiedemann (1797), from the stand-points of Leibnitz and Locke; Buhle (1804-5), a Kantian; Tennemann (1819), also a Kantian; Reinhold (1830); Ritter (1838); Hegel (1842); Schwegler (1848—his work has been translated into English by J. H. Seelye, N. Y., 1856, and J. H. Stirling, Edinburgh, 1867); Erdmann (1834-1866); J. H. Scholten (1861); Cousin (1828); G. H. Lewes (1846); Zeller (1844-69); Kuno Fischer (1854-76); Luigi Ferri (1868).

Periodicals devoted to Speculative Philosophy are (1), *Zeitschrift fuer Philosophie und Philosophische Kritik*, published at Halle; (2), *Philosophische Monatshefte*, published at Leipsic; (3), *Die Neue Zeit*, published at Prague; (4), *La Filosofia delle Scuole Italiane*, published at Rome; (5), *Mind*, a Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy, published in London; (6), *Revue Philosophique*, published in Paris.
